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Abstract 
This paper is aimed at assessing the impact of the degree of relative risk aversion on 
economic welfare for different levels of the interest rate and the exchange rate depreciation 
in a small open economy. To do this, a representative consumer-producer makes decisions 
on consumption, money balances, and leisure. In order to find a closed-form solution of the 
household’s economic welfare, it is assumed that individual’s preferences belong to the 
family of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions. Several comparative 
statics graphical experiments about the effects of the degree of relative risk aversion on 
economic welfare for different levels of nominal variables are carried out. Finally, we find 
that, under the stated assumptions, household’s economic welfare seen as a function of the 
degree of relative risk aversion is responsive to different values of nominal variables. 
 
JEL Classification: D11, D13, D60, F41, F31, E40 
Keywords: Consumer-producer economics, economic welfare, degree of relative risk 
aversion, small open economy, interest rate, foreign exchange. 
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Resumen 
Esta investigación tiene como objetivo evaluar el impacto del grado de aversión relativa al 
riesgo en el bienestar económico para diferentes niveles de la tasa de interés y la 
depreciación del tipo de cambio en una economía pequeña y abierta. Para hacer esto, se 
supone un consumidor-productor representativo que toma decisiones de consumo, saldos 
monetarios y ocio. Con el fin de encontrar una solución cerrada del bienestar económico 
del consumidor se supone que las preferencias del individuo pertenecen a la familia de 
funciones de utilidad de la Aversión Relativa al Riesgo Constante (ARRC). Se realizan 
varios experimentos gráficos de estática comparativa sobre los efectos del grado de 
aversión relativa al riesgo en el bienestar económico para diferentes niveles de variables 
nominales. Por último, se encuentra  que, de acuerdo con los supuestos establecidos, el 
bienestar económico del consumidor representativo visto como función del grado de 
aversión al riesgo relativo es sensible a diferentes valores de variables nominales. 
 
Clasificación JEL: D11, D13, D60, F41, F31, E40 
Palabras clave: Economía del consumidor-productor, bienestar económico, grado de 
aversión relativa al riesgo, economía pequeña y abierta, tasa de interés, tipo de cambio. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The number of investigations dealing with the impact of nominal variables on economic 
welfare is large and still increasing; see, for instance: Pugsley and Rubinton (2016), Shi 
(2015), Soriano-Morales et al. (2015), and Kim (2003). In particular, the effects of 
monetary policy on economic welfare are studied in Devereux and Engel (2003), and Betts 
and Devereux (2000). It is also enough to take a look at Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for 
an important number of references on this topic in the endogenous growth literature.
1
 
However, in reviewing all the above specialized literature, it is still missing to assess the 
impact of the degree of relative risk aversion on economic welfare. This research develops 
a model of a small open economy populated with infinitely-lived, risk-averse, identical 
                                                          
1
 A study for the Mexican case regarding the exchange rate depreciation risk and its hedging with contingent 
contracts can be found in González-Aréchiga et al. (2001). Another study for the Mexican economy regarding 
volatility issues on nominal variables is available in Venegas-Martínez and Islas-Camargo (2005). 
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individuals that make decisions on consumption, real money balances, and leisure. These 
individuals own the firms, which produce a single perishable good with a technology 
having constant marginal returns. We assume that the representative individual has 
preferences belonging to the family of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
functions. This class of felicity indexes is maybe the most widely used; see, for example: 
Battermann et al. (1997); Alvarez and Stokey (1998), Kamihigashi (2001), Dohmen et al. 
(2010), Boulier et al. (2001), Cairns et al. (2006), Deelstra et al. (2003), Moreno-Bromberg 
et al. (2012), Xie (2000), and Krause (2012). The main purpose of assuming that the utility 
function belongs to the CRRA family is to obtain a closed-form solution of the household’s 
economic welfare, 
 The aim of this research is to get a closed-form solution of economic welfare related 
to the decision making problem of utility maximization faced by a representative rational 
consumer-producer with perfect foresight. Subsequently, we carry out some comparative 
statics experiments regarding the impact of the degree of relative risk aversion on economic 
welfare for different levels of nominal variables. Specifically, household’s economic 
welfare is seen as a function of the degree of relative risk aversion and we show that 
economic welfare is responsive to different values of the interest rate and the exchange rate 
depreciation 
 The outline of the present research is as follows: section 2 presents the 
characteristics of the economy; section 3 states the household’s rational behavior; section 4 
describes the firm's rational behavior and the labor market equilibrium; section 5 provides a 
closed-form solution of household’s economic welfare, and carries out some comparative 
statics exercises on exogenous variables; finally, section 6 provides conclusions and 
acknowledges limitations. 
 
2. Characteristics of the economy 
Consider a small open economy with the following characteristics. Consumers and firms 
are assumed to be identical, which allows us to assume a representative individual that 
maximizes his satisfaction and profits.  Moreover, the economy produces and consumes a 
unique internationally traded good, which is, for the sake of simplicity, free of barriers to 
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trade. It is also assumed that producers share the same technology, which has constant 
returns to scale.  
It is suppose that the purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, that is, 
*
t t t
P P E , where 
tP  is the general price level of the domestic economy, 
*
tP  is the general price level of the 
foreign economy, and tE  is the nominal exchange rate. From this assumption, we can 
obtain the instantaneous percentage changes of all variables involved in the PPP condition, 
namely, ,t tP P   
* * *
t tP P  and ,t tE E   where  is the inflation rate in the domestic 
economy, *  is the inflation rate of the foreign economy, and   is the actual rate of 
exchange depreciation, which under perfect foresight it is also equals to the anticipated rate 
of exchange depreciation. Therefore, from the PPP relationship, it readily follows that 
 
* .                                                                 (1) 
 
Moreover, under perfect foresight, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) relationship is 
given by  
r i                                                                  (2) 
 
where r  is the domestic real interest rate and i  is the domestic nominal interest rate. In 
virtue that we have a small economy, it can be written 
*r r  where *r  stands for the 
foreign interest rate. It will be assumed that *
tP  is constant and equal to unity, that is, 
* 1tP  , this implies 
* 0,   therefore, we have .   Hence, by substituting (1) into (2),  
it follows  
* .r i                                                           (3) 
 
3. Household’s rational behavior 
In this section, we state the features of the representative household. First, the individual 
demands real money balances  
                                                              d
t t tm M P ,                                                         (4) 
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and also maintains real bonds, / ,
t t tb B P  which are internationally traded (with perfect 
capital mobility). Here, tM  is the nominal stock of money held by the individual, and tB  is 
the nominal price of the asset. We assume that the bonds pay the real interest rate 
*.r  The 
consumer gets income from labor given by s
twn  where 
s
tn  is the number of hours that he 
devotes to work, and w  is real wage per unit of time. The individual is also a producer 
owning his firm and getting a profit t . Therefore, the consumer’s budget constraint 
becomes: 
 
                                            
*d d s
t t t t t t tm b r b m wn c      .                                        (5) 
 
The representative rational consumer wishes to maximize his/her total discounted utility 
from consumption, tc , real monetary balances tm , and leisure 1
d s
t tl n  . It is worth 
mentioning that the number of total available hours of the individual has been restricted to 
unity. The agent wishes to maximize his/her total discounted utility
2
 
 
                                                         
0
( , , ) d
t
t t
d
tu c m l e t



                                                        (6) 
 
where ( , , )
t
d d
t tu u c m l  is the satisfaction index. Therefore, the representative individual 
wishes to solve the following intertemporal optimization problem  
 
                                              
t
0
Maximize ( , , ) d
t
d d
t tu c m l e t



                                               (7) 
subject to  
 
                                              
*d d s
t t t t t t tm b r b m wn c            
 
                                                          
2
 A stochastic set up of this utility maximization problem can be found in Venegas-Martínez (2000), (2005), 
(2006) and (2009), and Venegas-Martínez and González-Aréchiga (2000).   
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where   is the subjective discount rate (this parameter measures how anxious or 
compulsive is the individual for consuming). We suppose that 
0
dm  and 0b  are both given 
and known. From now on, for the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that the subjective 
discount rate is equal to the real interest rate, that is, 
*r  . It is worth noticing that the 
assumption of this equality means that it is just attained by coincidence since   is an 
intertemporal preference parameter and 
*r  is the international price of the bond market. 
Also, for the time being, it will be assumed that profit 0;t  this fact will be justified later 
on. From the above assumptions, the budget constraint becomes 
 
                                                  
* .d d st t t t t tm b r b m wn c                                               (8) 
 
The above equation can be rewritten, in a present value form, in the following way: 
 
                                          
*
0
0
( ) dd d s r tt t t tb c m m wn e t

    .                             (9) 
 
The Lagrangian, ( , , , )dt t tL c m l  , associated with maximizing (7) subject to (9) is given by 
* *
0 1 1 2 2(u ( ) u ( ) u (1 )) ( )   
        d s r t r t d d st t t t t t tL c m n e e c m m wn   
with 
 
1
, 1,
1u ( )
ln , 1.
i
i
ii
i
x
x
x






 
 
 
 
 
(10) 
 
and where i  for 0,1,2i  are constants (the degrees of relative risk aversion), and   is the 
Lagrange multiplier. The first-order conditions (necessary conditions) for an interior 
solution of the utility maximization problem are given by: 
0,
t
L
c



    
d
0,
dd dt t
L L
m t m
  
  
  
  and  0.
d
t
L
l



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The above second equation is known as the Euler-Lagrange equation. After computing the 
partial derivatives, it is obtained that 
 
0
1
,tc


  
 
(11) 
1
1
1
*
constant,
( )

 
 
  
 
d
tm
r
 
 
(12)           
0,dtm   (13) 
2
1
21 .stn
w


 
  
 
 
 
(14) 
 
In order to determine , equations (11)-(14) are substituted in constraint (9), so 
 
2
1 *20
2
2
1 20
2
1 11
1
1 2
0 *0
1 11
1
1 2
* *
1
d
( )
1 1
.
( )
r tb w w e t
r
w w
r r

 


 

 

   
 

   




 
                  
 
 
                  
 

 
 
 
 
(15) 
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows, it will be assumed that 0 1 2      , which 
implies 
1
1 1
1
2*
*
0
1
 .
w
r
r b w


  



 
  
 

 
 
 
(16) 
                               
4. Firms rational behavior and labor market equilibrium 
The main characteristic of the representative firm are the following: it is supposed that the 
firm’s production function uses only labor and has constant marginal returns,  
( ) ,d dt tf n An  
where A is a constant standing for the marginal product of labor. The firm wishes to 
maximize its profit  
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               ( ) .d dt t tf n wn     (17) 
 
The necessary condition for a maximum is given by w A . This also leads to 0.t   
Therefore, equilibrium in the market labor leads to  
 
1
*
2 0
1
1 1
1
2*
1
1
t
r b A
n
A A
r



 


 


 
 
 
  
  
         
  
 
 
 
 
 
  (18) 
 
 5. Household’s economic welfare 
The household’s economic welfare (indirect utility), W , is obtained by substituting the 
optimal decisions given in (11), (12) and (14) in the direct utility stated in (6), for 1  , we 
have  
 
   
 
  ** * *0 0 1 2 0
1 2
0
* 11 1
22 2 ** *
1 ln ln ln
11 1
( ) ( )
d
 
 
 
  
 
 

  
 
     
 

      
      
      
                     
           

r t
r b w r b w r b A
Ar
rr r
W e t
 
By using the result  
**
0
d 1r tr e t

   in the above integral, it follows that 
   
 
 * * *0 1 0 2 0
1 1 2*
1*1 1
2*2 2* *
1
ln ln ln
11 1
( ) ( )

 
 
 
  
 

      
        
        
                                     
W
r b w r b w r b A
r
Ar
rr r
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     
  
*1
* * *1 1
0 2 1 0 2* *
* 1
2 2 0 2*
1
                                                        
ln ln 1 ln ln 1
( ) ( )
ln ln 1
W
r
r b w r b w r
r r
r b A A
r

 
   
 

  

 
     
      
     
    
        
         
 
    

            (19)
 
 
Observe that economic welfare depends on the exchange rate depreciation, the interest rate, 
preference parameters, and initial endowments. For 1  , we have 
    *
1 1
1
0
1 1 2
1 1 1
d
r t
d d
t ttcW e t
m l
 


  
 
 




  

 
  
 
 
  
 * *
1
1
*
2 0
2 10 0 1 1
1
2*
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
d d
1
1






 







 



 


 

 



 

 
 
  
                                  
   
 
 
r t r t
r b A
A A
r
W e t e t
r
 
 
 
1
1 1
*
2 01
1 1 2* 1
1 1
1
2*
1 1
1
1
1


 
 



 

 
  

 


 


 
 
  
  
                      
             
    
W
r b A
r r
A A
r
 
 
 
1
1
*
01
1 1
1 1
1
2*
1
1 *
*
2 0
2 1
1 1
1
2*
1
1
1
1
1






 

 


 


 
 





 









 
  
   
                      
 
  
  
  
  
                  
W
r b w
r
w
r
r
r b A
A A
r
                          (20) 
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5.1. Comparative Statics 
In this section, we carry out some comparative statics graphical experiments about the 
effects of the degree of relative risk aversion on economic welfare for different values of 
nominal variables. In order to compute economic welfare, we establish the following 
parameter values: 1,A 0 1,b   0.04,   0.04,  1 1,  2 1,   and 1.w   If 
* (0,1].r   
In this case, we have 
*
0
W
r



 
for (0.5,1)  
*
0
W
r



 
for 1   
*
0



W
r
 
for 0.2    
The behavior of  
*
W
y
r



 as a function of the relative risk aversion parameter,  , with 
several values of the interest rate 
*r  is shown in the charts of Figure 1 (see Appendix A for 
the explicit partial derivative of y with respect r). 
 
Figure 1. Comparative statics graphical experiments of welfare as a function of   
with respect to different values of the interest rate 
 
y = D[(1/(r*(1-η)))(2+1/(r*+.04)^((1-η)/η))((r*+1)/(2+.04/((r*+.04)^(1/η))))^((1-η)/η),r*], 
 r* = 1 
  
y= D[(1/(r*(1-η)))(2+1/(r*+.04)^((1-η)/η))((r*+1)/(2+.04/((r*+.04)^(1/η))))^((1-η)/η),r*], 
r* =  0.5 
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y = D[(1/(r*(1-η)))(2+1/(r*+.04)^((1-η)/η))((r*+1)/(2+.04/((r*+.04)^(1/η))))^((1-η)/η),r*], 
 r* = 0.1 
  
y = D[(1/(r*(1-η)))(2+1/(r*+.04)^((1-η)/η))((r*+1)/(2+.04/((r*+.04)^(1/η))))^((1-η)/η),r*], 
r* = 0.025 
 
 
y = D[(1/(r*(1-η)))(2+1/(r*+.04)^((1-η)/η))((r*+1)/(2+.04/((r*+.04)^(1/η))))^((1-η)/η),r*], 
r* = 0.01 
  
y = D[(1/(r*(1-η)))(2+1/(r*+.04)^((1-η)/η))((r*+1)/(2+.04/((r*+.04)^(1/η))))^((1-η)/η),r*], 
r* = 0.001 
12 
 
  
Source: Author’s own elaboration with Wolfram Alpha.  
The above charts show that 
*
W
y
r



 has an asymptotic behavior on both sides of the 
horizontal axis at y = 0, for 0.2   and 1  . It can be seen that for a fixed * (0,1]r  : 
*
0
W
r



 for (0.5,1) , 
*
0
W
r



 for 1  , and 
*
0



W
r
 for 0.2   . 
 Now, let us consider the parameter values 1,A 0 1,b   * 0.025,r   1 1,  2 1,   
1,w   solving for r  and a fixed (0,1],  we have 
0




W
 
For 1   
0
W




 
For 0   
The behavior of  
W
y




 as function of the relative risk aversion parameters,  , for 
different values of   is shown in the charts of Figure 2 (see Appendix B for the complete 
partial derivative of y with respect  ). 
Figure 2. Comparative statics graphical experiments of welfare as a function of   
with respect to different values of the exchange rate depreciation 
 
D[(1/(.025(1- η)))(2+1/(.025+ε)^((1- η)/ η))((1.025)/(2+.04/((.025+ε)^(1/ η))))^((1- η)/ η),ε] , 
ε = 1 
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D[(1/(.025(1- η)))(2+1/(.025+ε)^((1- η)/ η))((1.025)/(2+.04/((.025+ε)^(1/ η))))^((1- η)/ η),ε], 
ε = 0.5 
  
D[(1/(.025(1- η)))(2+1/(.025+ε)^((1- η)/ η))((1.025)/(2+.04/((.025+ε)^(1/ η))))^((1- η)/ η),ε] , 
ε = 0.1 
  
D[(1/(.025(1- η)))(2+1/(.025+ε)^((1- η)/ η))((1.025)/(2+.04/((.025+ε)^(1/ η))))^((1- η)/ η),ε] , 
ε = 0.05 
  
D[(1/(.025(1- η)))(2+1/(.025+ε)^((1- η)/ η))((1.025)/(2+.04/((.025+ε)^(1/ η))))^((1- η)/ η),ε], 
ε = 0.01 
14 
 
  
Source: Author’s own elaboration with Wolfram Alpha.  
The above charts show that 
W
y




 has an asymptotic behavior on the right side of the 
horizontal axis at y = 0 for 1  . Moreover, it can be seen that for each fixed (0,1]  , 
0




W
 for 1  , and 0
W




 for 0  .  
 Notice also that  
0
0
W
b



 for all 0  , while 
0
0



W
b
 for all 0  . Finally, 
observe that household’s economic welfare, in a small open economy (price-taker), as 
function of the degree of relative risk aversion,  , is responsive to the values of the interest 
rate and the exchange rate depreciation particularly for small values of the deep parameter 
 . 
6. Conclusions  
In this research, within a small open economy framework, it was obtained a closed form 
solution of welfare economics as a function of the degree of relative risk aversion. To do 
this, we assumed identical rational individuals with preferences belonging to the CRRA 
family of utility functions. Several comparative statics experiments about the effects of the 
degree of relative risk aversion on economic welfare for different levels of nominal 
variables were carried out. Finally, we remark that economic welfare seen as a function of 
the degree of relative risk aversion is responsive to different values of the interest rate and 
the exchange rate depreciation. Needless to say, more research has to be done to include the 
stochastic behavior of the interest rate and the exchange rate depreciation by modeling with 
dynamics driven by mixed jump-diffusion processes modulated by a Markov chain 
(Markov regime switching). 
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Appendix A: Partial derivative of W with respect to r* 
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Appendix B: Partial derivative of W with respect to ε 
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